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Real Property
by Linda S. Finley*
The Author believes it appropriate to dedicate this Article to a man
who has served as a mentor and expert for hundreds (perhaps thousands) of real estate lawyers in the State of Georgia. Affectionately
known as "The Death Ray" by his students, who at one time or another
admired or feared him, Professor James C. Rehberg had the knack for
making a somewhat dry topic come alive (perhaps the exception being
the Rule Against Perpetuities). Professor Rehberg was honored in early
2004 by students, faculty, and alumni at his official retirement. While
the Author can do little to make this survey come alive as Professor
Rehberg surely would have done, nonetheless, it is presented with our
friend, mentor, and colleague, James C. Rehberg, in mind.
I. INTRODUCTION
This Article discusses case law and other developments in Georgia real
property law from June 1, 2003 through May 31, 2004. In the interest
of space, however, much must be omitted. The decisions below were
chosen for their significance to real property law and their significance
to any attorney who either regularly, or from time to time, practices in
the field of real property. Perhaps the most significant opinion in the
area of real property law during the survey period was the Georgia
Supreme Court's opinion that only attorneys licensed in the state, with
a minor exception, may conduct real property closings in Georgia.' Both
advocates seeking non-attorney closings and attorneys seeking a
mandate that only Georgia lawyers be allowed to preside over real estate
closings, claimed they were protecting the consumer. The supreme court
ultimately settled the issue as is discussed below.

* Partner in the law firm of McCalla, Raymer, Padrick, Cobb, Nichols & Clark, LLC,
Roswell, Georgia. Mercer University (B.A., 1978); Walter F. George School of Law, Mercer
University (J.D., 1981); Member, State Bars of Georgia and Florida.
1. In re UPL Advisory Opinion 2003-2, 277 Ga. 472, 588 S.E.2d 741 (2003).
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UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW

The Georgia Supreme Court, in a unanimous opinion, decided that the
preparation and execution of a deed of conveyance for another and the
facilitation of its execution by anyone other than a licensed Georgia
attorney constituted the unauthorized practice of law.2 The ruling put
an end to the issue of whether "witness-only closings" would violate the
rule prohibiting the unauthorized practice of law.' The court noted that
it had previously
issued formal advisory opinions which confirmed that a lawyer cannot
delegate responsibility for the closing of a real estate transaction to a
non-lawyer and required the physical presence of an attorney for the
preparation and execution of a deed of conveyance (including, but not
limited to, a warranty deed, limited warranty deed, quitclaim deed,
security deed, and deed to secure debt).4
The proponents of "lay conveyancing" (described by the court as "the
practice by which non-lawyers close real estate transactions, provide
settlement services, or select, prepare and complete certain real estate
closing documents")' or witness only closings (described by the court as
closings where "notaries, signing agents and other individuals who are
not a party to the real estate closing preside 'over the execution of the
deeds of conveyance and other closing documents, but purport to do so
merely as a witness and notary, not as someone who is practicing
law'"),6 argued that requiring the services of a Georgia attorney for real
estate closings and the execution of deeds of conveyance harmed the
public interest by increasing costs and stifling competition.7 The court
rejected this argument, determining that the public interest was best
protected when an attorney trained to recognize the issues at closing
oversees the transaction. The court stated that should attorneys fail
in their duties, the attorneys could be held accountable through a
malpractice or bar disciplinary action.9 "In contrast, the public has
little or no recourse if a non-lawyer fails to close the transaction
properly. It is thus clear that true protection of the public interest in
Georgia requires that an attorney licensed in Georgia participate in the

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

In re UPL Advisory Opinion 2003-2, 277 Ga. at 472-73, 588 S.E.2d at 741.
Id. at 473, 588 S.E.2d at 741.
Id.
Id. at 473 n.2, 588 S.E.2d at 742 n.2.
Id. at 473 n.3, 588 S.E.2d at 742 n.3.
Id. at 473, 588 S.E.2d at 742.
Id. at 473-74, 588 S.E.2d at 742.
Id. at 474, 588 S.E.2d at 742.
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real estate transaction.""° The opinion, however, did not change section
15-19-52 of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated ("O.C.G.A.")," which
documents to which they are a party so
allows non-lawyers to prepare
12
charged.
is
fee
no
as
long
III.

TITLE TO LAND

In Mansour Properties, LLC v. 1-85/Ga. 20 Ventures, Inc.,'3 the
parties owned approximately 110 acres of undeveloped land in Gwinnett
County. 1-85/Ga. 20 Ventures, Inc. ("1-85"), the assignee of a fiftypercent interest in the property, petitioned for statutory partition of that
real property. The property was jointly held by the owners as tenants
in common pursuant to a tenancy in common agreement. Under the
agreement each party agreed to be responsible for its share of promissory notes. Mansour took the role of investor, providing the cash for
closing, while 1-85 was to market the property for sale. The agreement
prohibited either party from transferring -)r encumbering the property
without the permission of the other. A party could transfer its interest
in the property if it had paid its portion of the notes held. First,
however, that party was to notify the other party of the potential
purchase, the price, and certify that the purchaser would assume the
selling party's rights and obligations. The non-selling party would have
a right of first refusal. 4
1-85 sought to partition the property without first offering to sell its
interest to Mansour. The trial court determined that partitioning of the
property would depreciate its value. The trial court ruled that the
property would be sold at public sale unless Mansour deposited
$12,202,666.67 into the court's registry, which represented Mansour's
portion of the appraised value."
Mansour appealed and claimed that the tenancy in common agreement
prohibited partitioning." Relying on Rhodes v. Lane,17 the supreme
court agreed and held that the right to first refusal in the agreement
implicitly precluded partitioning until Mansour was given the opportunity to purchase 1-85's interest.'8 The agreement also required 1-85 to

10. Id.
11. O.C.G.A. § 15-19-52 (2001).

12. Id.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

277 Ga. 632, 592 S.E.2d 836 (2004).
Id. at 633, 592 S.E.2d at 836-37.
Id. at 633-34, 592 S.E.2d at 837.
Id. at 634, 592 S.E.2d at 837.
202 Ga. 608, 44 S.E.2d 114 (1947).
Mansour, 277 Ga. at 635, 592 S.E.2d at 838.
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certify that a potential purchaser would assume 1-85's duties, which
included its duty to market the property. Certification would not be
possible if the property was offered for public sale. 9
In 1845 La Dawn Lane, LLC v. Bowman,20 the supreme court
considered who had proper title to a parcel of land originally planned as
a street, but never opened.2 1 Sarah 0. Bowman and Dorothy P. Bryant
lived next door to one another on Cardova Street in Atlanta. Running
between their properties was the land in dispute, a rectangular parcel
originally planned as a street. Both Bowman and Bryant's deeds
described one boundary of their respective properties by referencing the
land strip as a "future street."22
The subdivision where Bowman and Bryant lived was originally
developed in the 1940s by B.A. Martin. The chains of title descended to
The strip of land between
Bowman and Bryant from Martin.23
Bowman and Bryant was designated on the subdivision plat as "Future
Street," but the parcel was "never. . . accepted as a public street, either
expressly or implicitly, by either Fulton County or the City of Atlanta
following annexation."' Subsequently, 1845 La Dawn Lane, LLC ("La
Dawn") purchased a 3.29 acre tract known as Little Woods, which had
not been part of the subdivision and was never owned by Martin. La
Dawn claimed that Martin never transferred title to the parcel
designated as the future street. Rather, La Dawn claimed that title to
the strip remained in Martin's daughter as Martin's beneficiary under
his will. By quitclaim deed, Martin's daughter transferred all rights to
the strip to Southern Investments Associates from which La Dawn
claimed the future street parcel along with Little Woods.2
Bowman and Bryant brought a quiet title action to establish that each
had fee simple title to the centerline of the future street parcel.
Following a hearing before a special master, the special master found
that fee simple title resided in Bowman and Bryant because, as a matter
of law, when Martin sold the lots that Bowman and Bryant now owned,
he also conveyed the fee interest to the centerline of the undeveloped
street. The trial court adopted the special master's report and La Dawn
appealed.26

19. Id.
20. 277 Ga. 741, 594 S.E.2d 373 (2004).
21. Id. at 741, 594 S.E.2d at 374.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id
26. Id. at 741-42, 594 S.E.2d at 374.
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The supreme court held that designation of the parcel as a "future"
street was insufficient to serve as a grantor's express intent to reserve
title in himself.27 Further, fee interest of the parcel passed when the
grantor conveyed title to the abutting property owners' predecessors-intitle; thus, the later quitclaim deed from grantor's daughter could pass
no title to La Dawn.2" La Dawn also argued that the parcel had been
abandoned by the adjoining owners, but the court held that title to that
parcel could not pass from abutting property owners by mere abandonment.29 Finally, La Dawn argued that it had a right of access over the
parcel onto its property because the parcel was dedicated as a road."°
The court determined that "[a] right of public access to a road does not
occur until the road has been dedicated and accepted, either expressly
or impliedly, by the governing body."8 ' Because the 2parcel had never
been accepted as a road, La Dawn's argument failed.
In Parks v. Stepp,' two adjoining land owners disputed the ownership of a tract of land granted to both by a common grantor. A 2000
survey revealed that the metes and bounds of the property deeded to the
parties overlapped by 3.93 acres. Parks filed a complaint in ejectment
that concerned the disputed land.34
The evidence at trial established that Stepp had obtained title through
his predecessor who had entered into a contract with the original
developer of the land. A plat of the property, certified by a registered
land surveyor, was attached and incorporated into the original contract
for sale. 35 "[The] contract with the attached plat was filed and recorded
in the office of the clerk of the superior court of Dawson County on
January 30, 1978." 35 When Stepp obtained the property from his
predecessor, the developer executed a warranty deed to Stepp that was
recorded.37
The Parks also claimed ownership through a predecessor in title who
had entered into a contract with the original developer. This original
contract was executed six days before Stepp's contract but was never
recorded. The original contract was transferred to the Parks. The

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Id. at 742, 594 S.E.2d at 375.
Id.
Id. at 743, 594 S.E.2d at 375.
Id.
Id. (citing Healey v. City of Atlanta, 125 Ga. 736, 54 S.E.2d 749 (1906)).
Id.
277 Ga. 704, 594 S.E.2d 364 (2004).
Id. at 704-05, 594 S.E.2d at 365-66.
Id. at 704, 594 S.E.2d at 365.
Id.
Id.
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developer then executed a warranty deed to the Parks that was recorded.
The Parks' deed was recorded a few weeks before the developers deeded
property to Stepp.3 s
The Parks' claim arose because their warranty deed was recorded first
in time. 39 However, the supreme court held that a deed filed pursuant
to a sales contract that was recorded before the recordation of the deed
of transfer took priority over a later-filed deed.' The court looked to
the language of the statute,4 1 which provided:
[Tihe filing and recording of the "contract to sell" shall "be notice of the
interest and equity of the holder" from the date of fling and that a
deed will only take priority over a bond for title or a contract to sell or
convey realty from the same grantor if the deed is "filed for
2 record first
and is taken without notice of the former instrument.'
Second, the Parks contended that the trial court had incorrectly applied
The court determined that the statute addressing
statutory law.'
priority of contracts for sale of land, O.C.G.A. section 44-2-6, not the
statute addressing voluntary conveyances, O.C.G.A. section 44-2-3, 44
because the parties had paid valuable considergoverned the dispute
45
ation for their lots.
IV.

EASEMENTS, COVENANTS, AND BOUNDARIES

In Boyer v. Whiddon," Edward Whiddon sought an easement by
implication for ingress and egress across property owned by Boyer and
Singleton.47 The court of appeals reversed the trial court's decision and
concluded that the record was insufficient to create the easement by
implication.' The court first analyzed the statute49 that outlines the
methods by which a private way can be acquired. 0 Then the court
reviewed Pindar's real estate treatise,5 which provided that "[wihen
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Id. at 704-05, 594 S.E.2d at 365-66.
Id. at 705, 594 S.E.2d at 365.
Id. at 706, 594 S.E.2d at 367.
O.C.G.A. § 44-2-6 (Supp. 2004).
Parks, 277 Ga. at 705-06, 594 S.E.2d at 366.
Id. at 706, 594 S.E.2d at 367.
O.C.G.A. § 44-2-3 (Supp. 2004).
Parks, 277 Ga. at 706, 594 S.E.2d at 367.
264 Ga. App. 137, 589 S.E.2d 709 (2003).
I at 137, 589 S.E.2d at 710.
Id.
O.C.G.A. § 44-9-1 (1999 & Supp. 2004).
Boyer, 264 Ga. at 137, 594 S.E.2d at 710.

51.

DANIEL F. HINKEL, PINDAR'S GEORGIA REAL ESTATE LAW AND PROCEDURE

(5th ed. 1998).

§ 8-16
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determining whether an easement arose by implication after the division
and
of lands by the same owner, the order in which the dominant
52
servient estates [are] transferred is critical to the analysis."
The record showed that the property at issue was owned by one
individual until both parcels were foreclosed upon. The parties had
differing accounts of how the property was subsequently divided. The
record, however, failed to show critical transfer information (i.e., security
deed, assignments, and the dates of such purported assignments). 3
"Without this critical information about the timing of the property
transfers, the trial court could not properly determine whether an
easement by implication of law was created, when any such easement
was created, and whether it was extinguished by foreclosure.' 54 As a
result, it was error for the trial court to find that Whiddon was entitled
to an easement by way of implication for ingress and egress across
defendants' property.5 5
In Reece v. Smith,5 6 the Reeces owned a tract of undeveloped land
bordering a public road in Bartow County. They brought suit against
Smith, an adjoining landowner, for declaratory and injunctive relief after
Smith asserted the right to an easement across their land. After a
bench trial, the court determined that three adjoining landowners,
including Smith, had an easement across the Reece property. 7
Each of the parcels had at one time been part of an undivided tract of
land that was bound by Rock Fence Road, a public road. The property
was deeded intact several times until the Curtis family partitioned the
larger parcel in 1984. Ultimately, Smith acquired one of the parcels.5 "
The court of appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part, concluding
that the adjacent landowners who were landlocked had acquired an
easement by implication of law for the necessity of providing reasonable
access from a public road to their property.59 However, the trial court
erred when it ruled that the third landowner, who was not landlocked,
had the right to use the easement across Reece's property.6 °
The court reasoned that common law created an easement by necessity
when a grantor conveyed land without providing a means of egress and

52.

Boyer, 264 Ga. App. at 137, 589 S.E.2d at 710.

53. Id. at 139, 589 S.E.2d at 711.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56.

265 Ga. App. 497, 594 S.E.2d 654 (2004).

57.
58.
59.
60.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

497, 594 S.E.2d at 656.
498-99, 594 S.E.2d at 656.
499-500, 594 S.E.2d at 657.
500, 594 S.E.2d at 657.
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ingress as is embodied by O.C.G.A. section 44-9-1. 6' A non-landlocked
neighbor, however, did not acquire a right to use an implied easement
across Reece's property merely because the path of a road from the
landlocked tracts led across the non-landlocked property. 2 The Reeces
were entitled to limit use of the easement across their property to those
with a legal right of passage, which did not include Smith.' The court,
however, determined that the easement to those landlocked owners was
not limited simply to ingress and egress but was "available for uses that
are necessary to the reasonable enjoyment of any lawful development of
the land, and that do not unreasonably burden the . .. rights [of the]
Accordingly, the landlocked owners'
owners of the servient estate.'
running of underground utilities across Reece's property was necessary
to the reasonable enjoyment of their residence and did not unreasonably
burden Reece's rights.6 5
V. CONTRACTS & BROKERS
66
Parker,

the purchaser of real estate brought an action
In Mills v.
against the seller and sought specific performance of the sales contract
or, in the alternative, damages for breach of contract and fraud. Parker
sued Mills for breach of contract for her failure and refusal to close on
the property. Mills had attempted to avoid the breach of contract claims
by quit claiming the property to her husband before the closing to avoid
performance under the contract. Through a lengthy appeal process and
multiple court proceedings,67 the quitclaim deed was eventually set
aside as a fraudulent conveyance used in an attempt to avoid a creditor.
Mills was found in breach of the sales contract for her failure to close.68
The trial court awarded the purchaser damages for the breach of
contract. Those damages included sums for the cost of a trip to Atlanta
(as he had already moved from the area), lost interest on the earnest
money, the costs of moving, the costs of lost income due to the court
proceeding, and long distance telephone charges. Attorney fees were also
awarded.69

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 500-01, 594 S.E.2d at 658.
267 Ga. App. 334, 599 S.E.2d 301 (2004).
See Mills v. Parker, 253 Ga. App. 620, 560 S.E.2d 42 (2002).
Mills, 267 Ga. App. at 334, 599 S.E.2d at 303.
Id. at 335-36, 599 S.E.2d at 303.
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On appeal Mills challenged the sums that could be awarded to a
purchaser in a breach of a real estate contract suit.7 ° The appellate
court ruled in favor of Mills and stated the measure of damages, in a
case such as this, was the difference between the contract price and the
fair market value at the time of the breach."' The court stated "ItWhis
[was] so because the sum representing the difference between the [fair]
market value of the land and the contract price is the [true] measure of
the injuries and damage sustained by the purchaser because of the
buyer's failure to fulfill his obligations under the contract."72 The other
damages awarded the purchaser could not be properly recovered and the
appellate court remanded the case back to the trial court with directions.7 3
In Mitchell Realty Group, LLC v. Holt,74 Holt entered into a contract
to purchase property from James Garrett. Mitchell Realty Group
("Mitchell") served as the agent for both the buyer and the seller. Holt
later determined that the property would not be a choice location for a
car dealership and refused to close on the property. Mitchell sued Holt
for its brokerage commission.7 5
Mitchell relied upon the contract language that stated "[iun the event
the sale is not closed because of buyer's... failure or refusal to perform
any of their obligations herein, the non-performing party shall immediately pay the Broker(s) the full commission the Broker(s) would have
received had the sale closed .... 76 Holt, on a motion for summary
judgment, claimed that the contract was silent regarding the amount of
commission to be paid. The trial court granted Holt's motion because it
found the purchase and sale agreement did not identify the amount of
the commission to be paid, although the agreement did refer to a
commission.77
The Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision and
concluded that under the Brokerage Relationships in Real Estate
Transactions Act ("BRRETA"), the legislature intended the amount of
commission be stated in writing. 78 Mitchell asserted that the commission was set in writing, and two sets of documents listed the property.
The first document listed four properties, their sales prices, and an offer

70.
71.
72.

Id. at 335, 599 S.E.2d at 303.
Id.
Id.

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Id. at 336, 599 S.E.2d at 304.
266 Ga. App. 217, 596 S.E.2d 625 (2004).
Id. at 217-18, 596 S.E.2d at 626.
Id. at 218, 596 S.E.2d at 626.
Id.
Id. at 218-19, 596 S.E.2d at 626.
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of a ten percent commission.79 The court rejected this document
because it did not identify the parties to the contract or its terms. s
Further, the court determined that the ten percent commission was an
offer regarding the other three properties listed and not the subject
property.81 The court also rejected a "listing sheet" where the information was placed under "Sale Corn," concluding
that the document
82
constituted an offer rather than a contract.
VI.

FORECLOSURE

In Butler v. Household Mortgage Services, Inc.," Butler sued Household Mortgage Services, Inc. ("Household") and Fleet Mortgage Group
("Fleet") in an attempt to halt a foreclosure instituted by Fleet. Butler
alleged that the mortgage companies wrongfully repudiated an
agreement to roll Butler's debt into a new loan. The trial court granted
Butler a temporary restraining order in 1996 that prevented Fleet from
proceeding with the foreclosure.8
In 2001 Butler's attorney contacted the lender's counsel to discuss the
terms of a settlement offer. In that conversation Butler's attorney
questioned the rationale behind a proposed lump-sum payment by Butler
to settle the case. The lender's attorney indicated that he would speak
with his client about the terms of the proposed settlement. In that same
conversation, Butler's attorney attempted to negotiate forgiveness of
prepayment penalties and removal of negative credit reporting from
Butler's credit report. Later, the lender's attorney sent a revised
settlement offer to Butler. Butler's attorney responded by stating that
Butler accepted the offer of settlement, even though the offer failed to
reflect two agreed upon aspects of the settlement terms, and that those
agreed upon terms needed to be included in the final settlement
agreement. Butler's attorney then wrote a follow-up letter indicating
that a settlement had been reached and that the foreclosure could not
proceed. The lender's attorney responded by letter that no settlement
had been reached. The lender's attorney then moved the court to find
that no settlement had been reached and find that the lack of settlement
would allow the foreclosure to proceed.' "[Tihe court determined that

79. Id. at 219, 596 S.E.2d at 627.

80. Id.
81.
82.
83.
LEXIS
84.
85.

Id. at 219-20, 596 S.E.2d at 626-27.
Id. at 220, 596 S.E.2d at 627.
266 Ga. App. 104, 596 S.E.2d 664 (2004), cert. dismissed, No. S04C1208, 2004 Ga.
560 (Ga. June 28, 2004).
Id. at 105, 596 S.E.2d at 665.
Id. at 105-06, 596 S.E.2d at 665.
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'there was no meeting of the minds, and, therefore, no settlement
between the parties."'8 6
The court of appeals held that there was no valid agreement because
an agreement alleged to be in settlement and compromise of a pending
lawsuit must meet the same requisites of formation and enforceability
as any other contract. In this regard, it is well settled that an agreement between two parties will occur only when the minds of the parties
meet at the same time, upon the same subject matter, and in the same
sense.8

Butler did not accept the terms of the settlement offer; instead, he made
a counteroffer by insisting on additional terms. Accordingly, the
foreclosure properly proceeded.88
In McCain v. Galloway, 9 Galloway sought confirmation of a foreclosure on a junior lien secured by real property owned by McCain.
Galloway initiated proceedings to confirm the foreclosure sale, the first
step in seeking a deficiency judgment against McCain. The trial court
confirmed the sale. McCain appealed, contending that Galloway lacked
standing and authority to conduct the foreclosure and that the fair
market value of the property was not proven. McCain alleged that
Galloway was not the real party in interest because the senior lienholder
had subsequently foreclosed its lien.90 The court, however, held that
"'[tihe issue [of] whether [Galloway] was a real party in interest [was]
not relevant to [the] confirmation proceeding, which was commenced in
accordance with [O.C.G.A. section] 44-14-161(a) by the person instituting
the foreclosure proceedings [i.e., Galloway].'"'
During the confirmation hearing, McCain also argued that Galloway
failed to prove that the property sold for its true market value at the
foreclosure sale. At the hearing Galloway did not present the testimony
of an official appraiser of the property; instead, he testified about his
experience with the property, how much he had invested in it, how much
he had borrowed against it, and its condition at the time of foreclosure.
McCain also testified about the value. Galloway stated his opinion that
he bid the fair market value for the property. Taken together, the

86. Id. at 106, 596 S.E.2d at 666.
87. Id. (citing S. Med. Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 216 Ga. App. 289,291,454 S.E.2d
180, 182 (1995)).

88. Id.
89.

No. A04A0032, 2004 WL 1119478 (Ga. App. May 20, 2004).

90. Id. at *1-2.
91. Id. at *3 (quoting Sparti v. Joslin, 230 Ga. App. 346, 346, 496 S.E.2d 490, 491
(1998)).
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testimony was sufficient to show that the fair market value at the
92 time
proper.
both
were
foreclosure
the
of
confirmation
the
of sale and
In Tunnelite, Inc. v. Estate of Sims,93 the court of appeals analyzed
the priority of judgment creditors." One creditor obtained a judgment
against a debtor in a federal district court located in Georgia, did not
domesticate the judgment, and recorded the federal judgment on the
general execution document of Fulton County. Subsequently, a second
creditor obtained a judgment against the same debtor in the Fulton
County Superior Court and recorded the judgment on the general
execution document. In an action for declaratory judgment filed by the
second creditor, the trial court held that the federal court judgment was
and that the
a foreign judgment because it was
95 not domesticated,
priority.
had
lien
judgment
Georgia
The court of appeals reversed, holding that domestication of the
federal judgment was not required.9' Specifically, the court held that
be domesticated,
a judgment obtained in federal court did not have to
97
judgment.
court
state
a
over
priority
had
it
and that
VII.

LANDLORD AND TENANT

In Baker v. Housing Authority of Waynesboro,98 the court of appeals
reviewed the policy and contractual obligations of a city housing
authority's policy on accepting payment of rent." Baker entered into
a lease agreement with the Housing Authority. A dispossessory action
was filed when she failed to pay rent for two consecutive months. Baker
responded that she had paid the rent by mailing it, but the payment was
refused.1 °"
Both parties filed for summary judgment. Baker argued that the
Housing Authority's policy of accepting payment by mail was unclear.
Baker's general position was that she had "mailed" the rent on July 10th
and mailing by that date was in compliance with the terms of the
lease. 101

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Id.
266 Ga. App. 476, 597 S.E.2d 555 (2004).
Id. at 476, 597 S.E.2d at 556.
Id.
Id. at 477, 597 S.E.2d at 557.
Id. at 478, 597 S.E.2d at 558.
268 Ga. App. 122, 601 S.E.2d 350 (2004).
Id. at 123, 601 S.E.2d at 351.
Id. at 122, 601 S.E.2d at 350-51.

101. Id.
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The terms of the lease provided that rent was due on the first day of
the month "during normal business hours" and "delinquent if not paid
by the close of business (5:00 p.m.) on the tenth day" of the month. °2
Late payment would be accepted only twice in any twelve month period,
but in any event, not later than the twentieth day of the month.
Violations of these terms would result in a written note to the tenant
and cancellation of the lease.' °3
The court determined no ambiguity existed in the terms of the lease
itself, as terms such as "normal hours of business" and "by 5:00 p.m."
implied that receipt of the rent was a lease requirement rather than
mere tender.'" 4 "The grant of summary judgment to the Housing
Authority was appropriate because there was no dispute that the
Housing Authority accepted timely mailed payments; that Baker failed
to pay her rent timely on at least two prior occasions within the twelve
months preceding the payment at issue; and that Baker [failed to mail]
the payment in dispute" until the 10th of the month.' 5 The trial
court's grant of summary judgment to the Housing Authority was proper
because "[tihe construction of a lease is generally a question for the court
to determine as a matter of law. However, '[wihere the language of a
contract is clear, unambiguous, and capable of only one reasonable
06
interpretation, no construction is necessary or even permissible.''
In Baker, the lease was clear.
In TGM Ashley Lakes, Inc. v. Jennings,0 7 an apartment tenant was
strangled to death by Oliver, an employee of the landlord. Oliver had
previously been convicted of rape, armed robbery, residential burglary,
and other crimes. At the time he was hired, Oliver informed the leasing
manager that he had been in jail, but the manager performed no
background check. After hiring Oliver there were reports of numerous
unforced entry burglaries at the apartment complex. Residents believed
that an employee was committing the crimes. One resident found Oliver
in her home when she returned home unexpectedly. Oliver claimed he
was there to perform repairs but later the tenant found property
missing. The deceased tenant's parents ("Jennings") brought a wrongful
death action against the owner of the apartment complex, the manage-

102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Id. at 123, 601 S.E.2d at 351.
Id.
Id. at 123-24, 601 S.E.2d at 351.
Id. at 124, 601 S.E.2d at 352.
Id. at 123, 601 S.E.2d at 351.
264 Ga. App. 456, 590 S.E.2d 807 (2003).
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ment company, the property manager, and the leasing manager
(collectively, "TGM"). 08
Following a jury verdict in favor of Jennings, defendants appealed.1"9
The court of appeals affirmed, rejecting defendants' seven counts of
error ° Defendants argued that the trial court should have directed
a verdict on the negligent hiring and retention claim."' However, "the
manager who recommended Oliver for employment as a maintenance
worker knew that Oliver had been in trouble with the law, including
time spent in jail. This simple fact raises a jury issue of whether TGM
inquired into Oliver's past criminal record prior to
should have" further
2
hiring him.
Although TGM argued that a claim for negligent hiring or retention
could not stand because Oliver acted outside the scope of his employment,11the court found plaintiffs' case was even stronger for that
claim. 3
TGM learned that a series of unforced entries and burglaries had
occurred at the premises since Oliver had been hired; that some
residents suspected an employee; and that Oliver had been discovered
in one apartment without authorization. Also, one resident had even
suggested that criminal background checks be performed because she
was positive that an employee was the culprit.""
These facts were sufficient to raise an issue "for the jury of whether
TGM, acting reasonably, should have taken additional steps to investigate the criminal background of their employees, including Oliver."" 5
The court rejected TGM's position that it could not be liable for
premises liability because it did not have actual knowledge that Oliver
was a criminal." 6 TGM had a duty to keep the complex reasonably
safe. 1 7 "'It is sufficient if, by exercise of reasonable care, the defendant might have foreseen that some injury would result from his act or
omission, or that consequences of a generally injurious nature might
have been expected.'""' Oliver's past included multiple felony convic-
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Id. at 456, 590 S.E.2d at 811.
Id.
Id. at 459, 590 S.E.2d at 813.
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Id. at 459-60, 590 S.E.2d at 814.
Id. at 460, 590 S.E.2d at 814.
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Id. at 462, 590 S.E.2d at 815.
Id. at 460, 590 S.E.2d at 814 (quoting Henderson v. Nolting First Mort. Corp., 184
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tions. Had TGM investigated further, they would have seen a pattern
of property crimes and violence. A jury was authorized to conclude that
a violent attack on a tenant of the apartment complex was foreseeable. 119
TGM also contended that it could not be liable for negligent hiring
because the trial court dismissed the claim of respondeatsuperior. TGM
superior liability, the claim was
argued that without respondeat
"conceptually inapplicable.""0 The court disagreed and overruled its
12
holding in three previous cases.
Georgia law provides that a negligent hiring and retention claim can
be based on a tort that occurred outside the scope of employment."
With regard to tortious conduct, a claim of negligent hiring and
retention is very similar to a claim of premises liability. "The presence
of a mischievous human being on premises may constitute the danger
against which the law requires of the occupant reasonable care to
protect his invitee." Thus, it is the dangerous nature of the person in
general, not simply the person acting within the scope of his duties,
that is a concern."u

Previously, the court attempted to define the outer limit of liability for
negligent hiring and held that the theory of negligent hiring was
conceptually inapplicable if the tortious act did not occur "'during the
tortfeasor's working hours or the employee was acting under [the] color
of employment.'"'" Here, however, the court determined that it had
incorrectly construed the prior ruling to mean that there could be no
liability for negligent hiring and retention if the tort was committed
outside the scope of employment. 2 ' The court overruled its prior
decisions, to the extent that those opinions held that a claim of negligent
hiring and retention was conceptually inapplicable when the
26 employee
has committed a tort outside of the scope of employment.

Ga. 724, 737, 193 S.E. 347, 354 (1937)).
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. (quoting Henderson, 184 Ga. at 736, 193 S.E. at 353).
124. Id. at 461, 590 S.E.2d at 814-15 (quoting Lear Siegler, Inc. v. Stegall, 184 Ga. App.
27, 28, 360 S.E.2d 619, 620 (1987)).
125. Id., 590 S.E.2d at 815.
126. Id. at 462, 590 S.E.2d at 815 (to the extent that they followed this holding in
Dester v. Dester, 240 Ga. App. 716, 523 S.E.2d 635 (1999), Spencer v. Gary Howard
Enterprises,Inc., 256 Ga. App. 599, 568 S.E.2d 763 (2002), and Stephens v. Greensboro
Properties,Ltd., L.P., 247 Ga. App. 670, 544 S.E.2d 464 (2001), are also overruled by TGM
Ashley Lakes, Inc. v. Jennings, 264 Ga. App. 456, 590 S.E.2d 807 (2003)).

410

MERCER LAW REVIEW

VIII.

[Vol. 56

TAXATION

In National Tax Funding, L.P. v. Harpagon Co.,' 27 the court reviewed competing delinquent tax liens and the title held by the
purchaser of such liens."2 Both National Tax Funding ("NTF") and
Harpagon held tax liens against property located in Fulton County.
Heartwood 11 obtained writs of fieri facias ("fi. fa.") from the county Tax
Commissioner, levied upon the hens, and acquired the tax deeds to the
properties. Heartwood 11 then quitclaimed the property to Harpagon.
Harpagon served notice upon the delinquent taxpayers and others that
claimed an interest in the property, including NTF, and asserted the
statutory bar to the right to redeem the property from the tax sale.
Harpagon then sought to quiet title and a declaration that it owned the
property free and clear of all other claims, including the claim of NTF.
NTF argued its tax liens had never been paid and remained valid. 1"
The trial court adopted the findings of a special master and found that
"a tax sale divests all liens except the one levied upon from the property
sold, so as to give the tax sale purchaser marketable title."3 0 By
virtue of Heartwood l's tax sale purchase of the property (and its
transfer to Harpagon), Harpagon held title to the property free and clear
of NTF's tax liens.' 3 '
Upon review, the supreme court held that
the trial court erred by concluding that the tax sale of the property
held to satisfy Harpagon's predecessor's tax lien divested NTF's tax
lien interest from the property sold. By obtaining a tax sale deed to
the property, Harpagon may have obtained a defeasible fee interest in
the property, but its title was subject to encumbrance for at least one
year after purchase due to the other interested parties' statutory rights
of redemption."'
However, once Harpagon gave notice of the barment and the barment
period expired, the nature of Harpagon's interest in the property vested
Harpagon "'with an absolute and unconditional title to the land,
provided that such title was owned by the [original owner], and the tax
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sale was valid. '""'3 3 After the expiration of the barment period, Harpagon held indefeasible fee simple title to the property.13
The court saw another issue, however, and that was "whether
Harpagon's title to the property remained encumbered by NTF's tax lien
135
after NTF's failure to redeem the property" after notice of barment.
NTF argued the tax lien was enforceable until the tax obligation was
paid and relied upon O.C.G.A. section 48-2-56(a), 36 which provides
that "except as otherwise provided, liens for all taxes arise at the time
the taxes become due and 'shall cover all property in which the taxpayer
has an interest from the date the lien arises until such taxes are
paid.'"'13 7 The court, however, determined that once the right to
redeem expired, NTF could not claim its right through the taxpayer
taxpayer's interest terminated when the property was not
because the
13
redeemed.
Next, the court analyzed the steps that tax lienholders may take to
protect their interest in property sold at a tax sale to another lienholder. 39 Lienholders have two options: they may either file a claim to
collect against any proceeds from the sale, or they may assert their right
following the sale, via a statutory claim for redemption to obtain a first
"With these two options, the
priority interest in the property."4
legislature has ensured that holders of competing tax liens can take
adequate steps to protect their interest in property sold at a tax sale to
another lienholder."14 1 The court summarized as follows:
[W]here property is encumbered by competing tax liens and one
lienholder levies upon the property and obtains a tax deed to it, holders
of competing tax liens may either seek to collect from the tax sale
proceeds or may assert their rights to redeem the property from the tax
sale purchaser. If, however, the tax sale purchaser gives valid notice
under the barment statutes and the competing tax lienholder allows
the redemption period to mature and pass without taking any action,

133. Id. (quoting DANIEL F. HINKEL, PINDAR'S GEORGIA REAL ESTATE LAW AND
PROCEDURE § 4-5 (5th ed. 1998)).

134. Id.
135. Id.
136. O.C.G.A. § 48-2-56(a) (Supp. 2004).
137. National Tax Funding,277 Ga. at 43-44, 586 S.E.2d at 238-39 (quoting O.C.G.A.
§ 48-2-56 (1999 & Supp. 2004)).
138. Id. at 44, 586 S.E.2d at 239.
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and no longer encumbers the tax
its lien is divested from the property
42
sale purchaser's title interest.
In Edwards v. Heartwood 11, Inc.,'" another case that concerned the
redemption of a tax deed, the court analyzed the interested parties'
rights and duties following the sale of real property for taxes.'" The
appellate court held that a taxpayer's bankruptcy would invoke the
automatic stay" and render a tax sale held during the bankruptcy
void ab initio."
Ralph Kirk owned property that was subject to a deed to secure debt
in favor of Wells Fargo Credit Corporation ("Wells Fargo"). In March
1995, Kirk filed for bankruptcy protection. Unaware of the bankruptcy,
Wells Fargo foreclosed on Kirks property and recorded a deed under
power evidencing such sale. Based upon the deed, the Gwinnett Tax
Commissioner's office noted47that Wells Fargo had become the owner (and
taxpayer) of the property.
When Wells Fargo discovered Kirks bankruptcy in April 1995, its
foreclosing attorney fied an affidavit in the real estate records of
Gwinnett County voiding the foreclosure sale. The Tax Commissioner
was unaware that the affidavit had been filed. Despite the bankruptcy,
and without approval of the bankruptcy trustee, Kirk purported to sell
the property to Edwards on March 31, 1995. Edwards did not record the
warranty deed evidencing his purchase until January 2000, after Kirks
bankruptcy was closed. Also in January 2000, Edwards obtained a
mortgage loan from GMAC Mortgage Corporation ("GMAC"), which was
secured by the realty and satisfied the Wells Fargo mortgage.'"
Finding the ad valorem property taxes delinquent, Gwinnett County
notified Wells Fargo (based on its information that Wells Fargo was the
owner) of its intent to issue a writ of fi. fa. The taxes remained unpaid
and Gwinnett County issued the tax fi. fa. to Wells Fargo. Later,
88 (a different entity from Heartwood 11) purchased the
Heartwood
149
writs.
Heartwood 88 requested that a tax sale be conducted. A title
examination revealed that Edwards appeared to be the owner of the
property. Notices were sent to Wells Fargo, GMAC, and Edwards

142. Id. at 45, 586 S.E.2d at 240.
143.

264 Ga. App. 354, 590 S.E.2d 734 (2003).

144. Id, at 354, 590 S.E.2d at 735.
145. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2000).
146. Edwards, 264 Ga. App. at 354, 590 S.E.2d at 736.
147. Id., 590 S.E.2d at 735.
148. Id. at 354-55, 590 S.E.2d at 735-36.

149. Id. at 355, 590 S.E.2d at 736.
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informing each of the upcoming tax sale. The tax sale took place on
June 6, 2000, and Heartwood 11 purchased the property as the high
bidder at the sale."
Edwards and GMAC paid the statutory redemption price for the
property and then sued Heartwood 11, the Gwinnett County Tax
Commissioner, and the Gwinnett County Sheriff to set aside the tax
sale. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the trial court ruled in
favor of Heartwood 11 and against plaintiffs.''
The court of appeals did not reach the issue of whether the tax sale
should have been set aside. 5 2 Instead, the court analyzed the issues
created by Kirks bankruptcy and whether plaintiffs now had standing
The court determined that Kirk's sale of
to have the sale set aside.
the property to Edwards was void ab initio due to the bankruptcy, and
that at no time could Edwards have legitimately owned the property. 54 GMAC, therefore, could not have obtained a valid security
interest based on Edwards' title. Without title, the parties had no right
to challenge the sale and the trial court did not err in granting summary
judgment to Heartwood 11."

150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 355-56, 590 S.E.2d at 736.
Id. at 355, 590 S.E.2d at 736.
Id. at 356, 590 S.E.2d at 736.

